

Sustaining Road Infrastructure in Uncertain Environments: Madagascar's MROR Pilot and Lessons for Francophone Africa

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Literature review
3. Methodology
4. Country context and strategic rationale
 - 4.1 Road network challenge
 - 4.2 Failure of traditional contracting
 - 4.3 Strategic response: the MROR initiative
5. The MROR model: design, structure, and international positioning
 - 5.1 Design principles
 - 5.2 Contract structure
 - 5.3 Performance indicators and measurement
 - 5.4 Comparison with international models
6. Programme scope: the five pilot contracts
 - 6.1 Pilot portfolio overview
 - 6.2 Geographic and socio-economic significance
7. Financial framework and economic rationale
8. Implementation progress and performance results (March 2026)
 - 8.1 Phase A completion status
 - 8.2 Lot-by-lot progress narrative
9. Governance, oversight, and enforcement
 - 9.1 Institutional architecture
 - 9.2 Enforcement mechanisms
10. Key risks and mitigation measures
11. Lessons learned: a balanced assessment
 - 11.1 Key lessons
 - 11.2 Market response and contractor perspective

12. Strategic roadmap: scaling the MROR model (2026–2030)

12.1 Vision and scale-up ambition

12.2 Implementation priorities

13. Conclusion and recommendations

14. Acknowledgements

15. References

Abstract

Background: Madagascar's road network is in severe structural decline: fewer than 40% of paved roads are in good or fair condition, vehicle operating costs run 30–50% above regional benchmarks, and approximately 17 million people remain disconnected from the national network. Roads rehabilitated under conventional unit-price contracts routinely return to poor condition within two to four years — evidence of a systemic incentive failure that input-based procurement cannot resolve. In response, Madagascar's Road Agency (ARM) launched the Marchés Routiers à Obligation de Résultats (MROR) — the first full application of the obligation de résultats framework in performance-based road maintenance contracting in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, financed under the World Bank Projet de Développement Durable du Secteur Routier PDDR project (IDA Credit No. 6952-MG, P176811).

Aim and scope: This paper presents a structured, evidence-based case study of the MROR pilot, rigorously assessing what works, where limitations persist, and what can be credibly replicated across Francophone African road agencies. **The programme spans 277.4 km of paved national roads** across four regions and five contract lots, with a total envelope of USD 10 million (including USD 5.67 million in confirmed civil works), corresponding to an **average unit cost of approximately USD 20,400 per kilometer**, and covering the full 36-month rehabilitation and performance-based maintenance obligation. The model is deliberately positioned as emergent, offering early operational insights rather than a fully validated benchmark.

Main conclusions: As of March 2026, Phase A rehabilitation is 100% complete across all five contracts with four domestic contractors engaged — **confirming the commercial viability of results-based delivery in a constrained institutional environment**. Seven replicable lessons are drawn: results-based incentives demonstrably drive quality contractor behaviour; MSV measurement frequency is the single most critical operational risk; cantonnement obligations are systematically underestimated; and rigorous pre-contract baseline surveys are essential for defensible Phase B enforcement. Three enabling conditions are identified for credible scale-up: Phase B performance validation, MSV capacity standardisation, and Road Fund readiness. A scale-up roadmap targeting more than 2,500 km under MROR by 2030 is outlined.

Keywords: performance-based road maintenance; obligation de résultats; results-based contracting; road asset management; Francophone Africa; Madagascar.

1. Introduction

Road infrastructure is the backbone of economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa, yet the region's road networks remain among the most degraded in the world. Conventional approaches to road maintenance procurement — typically unit-price, input-based contracts — have proven structurally inadequate: contractors are paid for executing prescribed works regardless of whether road condition is sustained, discrete annual contracts do not incentivise multi-year maintenance planning, and no mechanism compels response to defect emergence after acceptance (World Bank, 2017; Alex-Hart and Obiora, 2018). The result is a persistent cycle of build-degrade-rehabilitate that consumes public resources without delivering durable infrastructure.

Performance-based road contracting (PBC) has emerged internationally as a response to these structural failures. Under PBC arrangements, contractors are paid for delivering and maintaining specified road conditions rather than executing prescribed work quantities, creating a direct commercial incentive for quality and durability (Stankevich et al., 2005). The World Bank has promoted PBC through its Output- and Performance-Based Road Contract (OPRC) toolkit, with documented applications under the CREMA model in Latin America and in a limited number of African countries (Gwilliam et al., 2008; Liautaud, 2000). However, in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, only a few full-scale applications of the obligation de résultats framework have been documented in the peer-reviewed literature.

In 2023, Madagascar's Road Agency (ARM), in partnership with the World Bank, launched the Marchés Routiers à Obligation de Résultats (MROR) pilot programme — the first comprehensive application of performance-based road maintenance contracting in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. Financed under the World Bank – PDDR project (IDA Credit No. 6952-MG, P176811), the pilot covers 277.4 km of paved national roads across four regions and five contract lots, with a total budget of USD 10 million.

The objectives of this paper are: (i) to present a structured, evidence-based evaluation of the MROR pilot's design and implementation; (ii) to document results, operational challenges, and lessons learned from Phase A and early Phase B; and (iii) to assess conditions under which the model can be credibly transferred to other Francophone African road agencies. The study contributes to knowledge as the first peer-reviewed case study of performance-based road contracting in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 situates the MROR within the international literature on performance-based road contracting. Section 3 describes the case study methodology. Section 4 presents the country context and strategic rationale. Sections 5 through 7 detail the MROR model design, programme scope, and financial framework. Section 8 reports implementation progress as of March 2026. Sections 9 and 10 describe the governance architecture and key risks. Section 11 distils seven lessons learned, including market response. Section 12 presents the scale-up roadmap. Section 13 concludes with recommendations.

2. Literature review

Performance-based road contracting represents a fundamental departure from conventional procurement. Under traditional input-based contracts, the client specifies work quantities, materials, and methods; the contractor is paid for execution regardless of outcome. Under PBC, the client defines required service levels and the contractor determines the means of achieving and sustaining those levels. By transferring performance risk to the contractor and linking payment to outcomes, PBC aligns commercial incentives with infrastructure durability (Zietlow, 2004; Stankevich et al., 2005).

The World Bank has been the principal international proponent of PBC in the roads sector, developing a standardised OPRC toolkit and publishing a model bidding document for *Marchés Routiers à Obligation de Résultats* (World Bank, 2017). The most extensively documented applications are in Latin America, where the CREMA model has been deployed since the late 1990s in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Peru (Liataud, 2000; Cordeiro and Zietlow, 2010). Evaluations of CREMA report positive outcomes — reduced unit costs, improved road condition sustainability, and a maturing contractor market — while also identifying recurring challenges: the importance of independent supervision, the difficulty of defining objective service-level indicators, and the risk of enforcement weakening under commercial pressure.

The African PBC experience is considerably more limited. Early pilots in Chad, Tanzania, and Zambia produced mixed results: contractor capacity constraints, weak enforcement, and irregular payment streams undermined the model's incentive structure (Gwilliam et al., 2008). Alex-Hart and Obiora (2018) concluded that institutional readiness — particularly the independence and technical capacity of performance monitoring bodies — is the decisive variable for success. Critically, the peer-reviewed literature offers no documented case study of performance-based road contracting in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. This absence is not trivial. The region operates within distinct civil law frameworks, administrative traditions, and contractor market structures that diverge materially from those observed in Anglophone Africa and Latin America — contexts from which most existing evidence is drawn. Against this backdrop, the MROR pilot constitutes a substantive addition to the global evidence base. It provides context-specific insights with immediate operational relevance for road agencies across Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Niger, and Senegal, where similar institutional conditions prevail.

3. Methodology

This study employs a single-case embedded case study design (Yin, 2018), with the MROR pilot programme constituting the case and the five individual contract lots serving as embedded units of analysis. This design permits within-case comparison across diverse operational contexts (highland, peri-urban, semi-arid corridors) while maintaining analytical coherence at the programme level. Data were drawn from four principal sources: (i) contract monitoring data including Phase A completion records and Phase B payment monitoring through March 2026; (ii) independent MSV field assessments against five quantified service-level indicators; (iii) structured stakeholder reviews — joint inspection reports from multi-actor reviews involving ARM, the UGP, the MSV, regional transport directorates (DRTP), and contractors (March 2026); and (iv) procurement and financial documentation from World Bank STEP records through April 2025.

The analytical approach combined within-case description with cross-case synthesis to identify patterns, divergences, and emergent lessons. Data triangulation was achieved by cross-referencing contractor self-reported progress against independent MSV observations and ARM contract records. Three principal limitations apply: (i) quantitative MSV performance data is under verification, with the consolidated Phase A Performance Report expected in Q2 2026; (ii) Phase B data covers only two of five lots as of March 2026; and (iii) as a single-country case study, generalisability must be approached cautiously — lessons are intended as transferable insights subject to local validation.

4. Country context and strategic rationale

4.1 Road network challenge

Madagascar's classified road network extends to approximately 31,600 km, of which around 7,200 km are paved. Fewer than 40% of paved roads are in good or fair condition; vehicle operating costs run 30–50% above regional benchmarks; and approximately 17 million people remain disconnected from the national network, with a Rural Accessibility Index of just 11.4%. These conditions — reflecting decades of deferred maintenance and repeated climate shocks — create a measurable drag on agricultural supply chains, access to social services, and economic productivity.

4.2 Failure of traditional contracting

Successive administrations have addressed the maintenance deficit through conventional input-based procurement. This approach has failed structurally: contractors are paid for executing prescribed works regardless of whether road condition is sustained; discrete annual contracts do not incentivise multi-year maintenance planning; and no mechanism compels response to defect emergence after acceptance. Roads consistently returned to poor condition within two to four years.

4.3 Strategic response: the MROR initiative

The MROR initiative was designed to break the build-degrade-rehabilitate cycle by introducing a contractual model in which the contractor's commercial incentives are directly aligned with infrastructure durability. By bundling rehabilitation and maintenance into a single results-based contract, ARM — in partnership with the World Bank — pursues three objectives: (i) closing the structural gap between rehabilitation and maintenance; (ii) incentivising quality execution over the full asset life cycle; and (iii) generating a verifiable performance track record to inform future financing and scaling decisions.

The five pilot contracts were deliberately selected to reflect a diversity of operational contexts: highland corridors (RNS 43), peri-urban and eastern plateau axes (RNS 44 and the Rocade/RNS 65), and a long-distance southern route (RNT 9). All selected corridors are relatively recent investments within ARM's portfolio.

5. The MROR model: design, structure, and international positioning

5.1 Design principles

The MROR is built on four core design principles: (i) output-based specification — the contract defines required road conditions rather than prescribing input quantities; (ii) risk transfer to the private sector — payment deductions apply automatically when service levels fall below threshold, without requiring proof of contractor fault; (iii) long-term asset stewardship — contracts span 36 months, forcing contractors to internalise life-cycle cost considerations; and (iv) verifiable performance monitoring — compliance is determined through structured, periodic field inspections against quantified indicators defined contractually.

5.2 Contract structure

Phase A — Rehabilitation and Upgrading (6–18 months): the contractor executes all works necessary to bring the road to contractual service levels. Phase A concludes with formal provisional acceptance (réception provisoire) once all snagging items are resolved. The baseline condition established at acceptance becomes the reference for Phase B monitoring.

Phase B — Performance-Based Maintenance (18–24 months): following acceptance, the contractor delivers maintenance services to sustain Phase A-level conditions. Payments are conditional on MSV-verified compliance. The contractor has full latitude to choose maintenance methods — the obligation is to the outcome.

5.3 Performance indicators and measurement

Five performance indicators define the Phase B service-level obligations; their contractual thresholds, measurement frequency, and enforcement consequences are set out in Table 1.

Table 1 — MROR service-level indicators and enforcement consequences

Performance Indicator	Contractual Threshold	Measurement Frequency	Enforcement Consequence	Status (Mar 2026)
Longitudinal roughness (IRI)	< 4.0 m/km	Quarterly	Payment deduction if exceeded	Phase B monitoring commenced
Potholes (depth > 10 cm)	0 per km	Monthly	Immediate payment suspension	Phase B monitoring commenced
Signage compliance	> 95% functional	Monthly	Deduction proportional to deficit	Under Phase B monitoring
Functional drainage	> 90% of network	Quarterly	Deduction + corrective notice	Under Phase B monitoring
Emergency response time	< 24 hours per event	Per event	Financial penalty per excess hour	Protocol in place

5.4 Comparison with international models

The MROR's most distinctive feature relative to African precedents is its explicit obligation de résultats framing — a stronger legal foundation than most African PBC pilots, which define performance as a target rather than a contractual prerequisite for payment. The model draws directly on the World Bank's OPRC standard bidding document (World Bank, 2017), adapted to Madagascar's civil law framework. Madagascar also benefits from lessons documented under CREMA deployments in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil (Liautaud, 2000; Cordeiro and Zietlow, 2010), particularly regarding independent supervision and objective service-level indicator design.

6. Programme scope: the five pilot contracts

6.1 Pilot portfolio overview

Table 2 summarises the five pilot contracts, their geographic coverage, contractors engaged, and Phase A completion status as of March 2026.

Table 2 — MROR pilot portfolio dashboard (March 2026)

Lot	Road	Section	Length (km)	Contractor	Region	Status (Mar 2026)
1	RNS 44	Moramanga – Amboasary	60.0	Madvita-Fixobloc	Alaotra Mangoro	Complete – Phase B active
2	RNS 65 / Rocade	Ring road, Moramanga zone	13.0	Madvita-Fixobloc	Alaotra Mangoro	Complete – Phase B initiated
3	RNS 43	Soavinandriana – Faratsiho	51.6	TAHINA SARL	Vakinankaratra/Itasy	Complete – Acceptance underway
4	RNS 43	Faratsiho – Sambaina	43.8	RBA	Vakinankaratra	Complete – Acceptance underway
5	RNT 9	Toliara – Analamisampy	109.0	SAHAZA TANATSARA	Atsimo Andrefana	Complete – Acceptance underway
TOTAL	5 corridors, 4 regions		277.4	4 contractors		100% Phase A complete




Figure 1 — Distribution of ARM's main infrastructure interventions in relation to the five MROR pilot corridors

6.2 Geographic and socio-economic significance

The five corridors were selected to maximise geographic, climatic, and economic diversity. The highland RNS 43 serves agricultural smallholders and connects major agro-processing centres. The RNS 44 and Rocade are critical for freight and peri-urban mobility in the Alaotra Mangoro rice basin. The RNT 9 serves a vast semi-arid southern region where road disruption has severe

humanitarian consequences during cyclone events. This diversity provides a robust basis for cross-contextual learning — essential for any credible scale-up of the MROR approach across Madagascar’s varied territory.

7. Financial framework and economic rationale

The pilot is financed entirely through the World Bank PDDR project (IDA Credit No. 6952-MG, P176811), with a total programme budget of USD 10 million (USD 5.67 million in confirmed direct civil works contracts; source: WB STEP, April 2025). At an average unit cost of approximately USD 20,400/km covering the full 36-month rehabilitation and maintenance obligation, the MROR offers a structurally different value proposition relative to conventional Sub-Saharan African rehabilitation contracts (typically USD 50,000–150,000/km for works only, without maintenance). Phase A payments are milestone-based; Phase B payments are performance-conditional monthly disbursements adjusted for MSV-verified service-level shortfalls. Road Fund payment reliability is a critical precondition for Phase B success.

8. Implementation progress and performance results (March 2026)

8.1 Phase A completion status

Table 3 summarises Phase A implementation status and available field observations for each lot. Quantitative MSV performance data (IRI, potholes, signage compliance, drainage) is currently under verification and will be published in the consolidated Phase A Performance Report (target: Q2 2026). Field narratives reflect direct observations from joint inspections conducted in March 2026.

Table 3 — Phase A implementation status by lot (March 2026)

Lot	Road	Phase A %	Phase B Status	Snagging Reserves	MSV Data	Key Field Observation
1	RNS 44	100%	Active (Phase B)	Cleared	Under verification – Q2 2026	Pavement condition at contractual baseline; Phase B payment stream initiated
2	RNS 65 / Rocade	100%	Initiated (Phase B)	5 reserves pending (Mar 2026)	Under verification – Q2 2026	Urban interface corridor; 5 snagging items formalised March 2026; 7–15-day resolution deadlines set
3	RNS 43 (Lot 3)	100%	Acceptance underway	Minor observations	Under verification – Q2	Satisfactory pavement + drainage; strong

Lot	Road	Phase A %	Phase B Status	Snagging Reserves	MSV Data	Key Field Observation
					2026	local authority engagement; community acceptance positive
4	RNS 43 (Lot 4)	100%	Acceptance underway	Minor observations	Under verification – Q2 2026	Highland corridor; effective drainage rehabilitation; stakeholder support documented
5	RNT 9	~95%	Acceptance underway	Cantonnage reserve (resolved)	Under verification – Q2 2026	109 km semi-arid southern corridor; climate exposure high; cantonnage reserve corrected within 1 month

Note: Quantitative performance data (IRI, potholes, signage %, drainage %) are under verification and will be published in the consolidated ARM/MSV Phase A Performance Report, target Q2 2026.

8.2 Lot-by-lot progress narrative

Lot 1 (RNS 44, 60 km) has fully transitioned to Phase B with payment monitoring underway. Lot 2 (Rocade/RNS 65, 13 km) initiated Phase B following formalisation of five snagging reserves with binding 7–15-day resolution deadlines, demonstrating the enforcement mechanism in operation. Lots 3 and 4 (RNS 43, 95.4 km combined) achieved full Phase A completion with satisfactory pavement and strong local stakeholder engagement; formal acceptance is underway. Lot 5 (RNT 9, 109 km) — the longest and most geographically exposed corridor — completed Phase A with a cantonnage reserve resolved within one month; acceptance steps are in progress.

9. Governance, oversight, and enforcement

9.1 Institutional architecture

The MROR programme operates within a four-tier governance structure ensuring independent technical oversight, clear accountability, and performance-based enforcement across all contracts (Figure 2). ARM acts as contracting authority, enforcing compliance with defined service levels rather than prescribing technical solutions. The UGP ensures day-to-day alignment with World Bank procedures and serves as the interface between ARM, contractors, and the Bank. The MSV conducts independent field inspections and validates contractor performance — payments are contingent on verified results. Contractors bear full life-cycle responsibility for rehabilitation and sustained maintenance at prescribed service levels (Figure 3).

MROR Programme — Governance & Accountability Architecture

Madagascar Road Agency (ARM) | PDDR Project — IDA Credit N° 6952-MG | March 2026




Figure 1 — MROR Governance & Accountability Architecture | ARM Madagascar / PDDR IDA N° 6952-MG | March 2026

MROR Programme Governance and Accountability Architecture

Figure 2 — MROR programme governance and accountability architecture

9.2 Enforcement mechanisms

The independence and technical capacity of the MSV is the central enforcement pillar. The most significant operational risk identified during Phase A is MSV measurement frequency shortfalls, particularly on the RNT 9 corridor (109 km), where logistical constraints created gaps in the performance data record. The snagging enforcement mechanism demonstrated during the March 2026 Rocade inspection showed the system functioning as designed: Phase A acceptance was conditioned on independently verified snagging clearance. Current contracts provide for a two-stage dispute resolution process — direct negotiation supported by the MSV measurement record, followed by escalation to administrative arbitration — with a DAB-style clause recommended for future contract iterations.

MROR Contract Lifecycle – Phase A to Phase B




Figure 2 — MROR Contract Lifecycle (Phase A → Phase B) | ARM Madagascar / PDDR IDA N° 6952-MG | March 2026

MROR Contract Lifecycle Phase A to Phase B

Figure 3 — MROR contract lifecycle (Phase A to Phase B)

10. Key risks and mitigation measures

The three highest-priority operational risks identified during Phase A are: (i) weak enforcement of payment deductions under Phase B commercial pressure; (ii) MSV measurement frequency shortfalls (documented on the RNT 9 corridor); and (iii) Road Fund payment delays that could undermine contractor confidence in the Phase B incentive structure. Mitigation measures are embedded in the Phase B enforcement protocol and are reflected in the lessons framework in Section 11.

11. Lessons learned: a balanced assessment

11.1 Key lessons

Table 4 presents the seven key lessons drawn from Phase A implementation, with supporting evidence from the pilot and implications for scale-up.

Table 4 — Lessons learned with implications for scale-up

#	Lesson Learned	Evidence from Pilot	Implication for Scale-Up
1	Results-based incentives drive quality behaviour	Contractors self-mobilised additional resources to recover Phase A delays and clear snagging findings — behaviour not observed under conventional contracts	Maintain strict output-based payment conditioning in all future contracts; avoid diluting with input-based provisions
2	Multi-actor joint inspections build shared accountability	UGP/MSV/DRTP/local authority joint inspections effective in creating social accountability alongside technical enforcement	Replicate joint inspection model at scale; formalise DRTP role in monitoring protocol
3	Phase A/B snagging mechanism is an effective quality gate	Conditionality of Phase B payment on Phase A acceptance drove rapid contractor response to March 2026 Rocade inspection findings	Maintain strict snagging protocol in all future contracts; publish deduction register transparently
4	MSV measurement frequency is the critical operational risk	RNT 9 logistical constraints led to documented MSV frequency shortfalls — the most operationally significant gap in Phase A	Increase MSV budgets; introduce digital data collection; set contractual penalties for MSV frequency shortfalls
5	Cantonnage is systematically underestimated	Recurring cantonnage reserve across all 5 contracts suggests systematic design gap or contractor prioritisation deficit	Revise contract design to increase cantonnage obligation weighting; add specific cantonnage inspection step
6	Baseline documentation is a critical governance gap	Incomplete pre-contract condition baselines make it difficult to demonstrate quantum of improvement or defend deduction decisions	Mandate independent, GPS-referenced baseline surveys before any future MROR contract award
7	Long-distance corridors require differentiated contract design	RNT 9 (109 km, semi-arid) generated disproportionate logistical and MSV challenges vs. shorter corridors	Introduce corridor-specific logistical support clauses and dedicated MSV staffing for contracts > 80 km

11.2 Market response and contractor perspective

Four domestic contractors participated across five lots, representing a cross-section of Madagascar's road construction sector. Three conditions for sustained contractor engagement were consistently identified: (i) payment reliability — on-time disbursement from ARM supported by Road Fund ring-fencing; (ii) clear and standardised MSV measurement rules, particularly for signage compliance and drainage assessments; and (iii) fair force majeure provisions for climate-driven deterioration. Early indications suggest that pilot contractors would consider bidding on future MROR contracts, contingent on these conditions.

12. Strategic roadmap: scaling the MROR model (2026–2030)

12.1 Vision and scale-up ambition

The ultimate ambition is the progressive transformation of Madagascar's road maintenance contracting framework — from an input-based, fragmented model to a results-based system covering a significant share of the national paved network. A credible scale-up scenario would target more than 2,500 km (more than 35% of the paved network) under MROR by 2030. This ambition is achievable — but not unconditional. Three enabling conditions must be met before scale-up is viable: (i) Phase B performance validation; (ii) MSV capacity and standardisation; and (iii) Road Fund readiness. Scale-up without these foundations risks replicating the failure modes of previous ambitious contracting reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 5 sets out an indicative scale-up roadmap with target coverage, financing sources, and key preconditions for each implementation phase.

Table 5 — Indicative MROR scale-up roadmap 2026–2030

Phase	Period	Target (km MROR)	Financing	Key Preconditions
Pilot Consolidation	2025–2027	277.4 km (current)	World Bank PDDR	Phase B data validated; lessons documented; enforcement protocol operational
2nd-Generation Pilot	2027–2028	~500–700 km	World Bank + Road Fund + EIB/OPEC Fund	Phase B performance confirmed; 2nd procurement wave; ARM capacity built
Regional Scale-Up	2028–2029	~1,200–1,500 km (~20% of paved)	Blended (Road Fund + IFIs)	Domestic market competition; institutional framework; MSV standardised
Systemic Mainstreaming	2029–2030	>2,500 km (>35% of paved)	Road Fund primary; IFI supplementary	Road Fund adequacy validated; full ARM institutional capacity; digital monitoring

12.2 Implementation priorities

Short-term (2026–2028): maintain World Bank PDDR financing for second-generation contracts while engaging EIB and OPEC Fund as co-financiers; prioritise Road Fund institutional strengthening. Medium-term (2028–2030): transition Road Fund to primary responsibility for Phase B recurring maintenance payments, with IFI financing focused on Phase A rehabilitation investment. Three institutional prerequisites are essential before any scale-up commitment: (i) a dedicated MROR contract management unit within ARM with protected budget and stable career paths; (ii) a national MSV protocol standardising measurement methods, inspection frequency, and digital reporting across all corridors; and (iii) a comprehensive Road Fund adequacy assessment prior to any scale-up financing commitment.

13. Conclusion and recommendations

Madagascar's MROR pilot is a genuine and significant step forward in road asset management for Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa. The programme has demonstrated that performance-based contracting principles can be made operational in a challenging institutional and geographic environment — that domestic contractors can adapt to results-based obligations, and that multi-actor oversight frameworks can function across geographically diverse corridors.

At the same time, the pilot is not yet a proven success. The definitive test — Phase B performance across 277.4 km over 18–24 months — is only beginning. The data gaps identified in this review, the operational challenges documented in Phase A, and the structural risks outlined in Section 10 must be actively managed if the MROR model is to deliver on its promise and justify confidence in a broader roll-out.

Madagascar is best positioned at this stage as an emerging African reference for performance-based road contracting — a programme generating important lessons for the international community, but one that requires continued rigorous implementation, honest self-assessment, and sustained partner engagement before it can be presented as a fully replicable model. In doing so, this paper has fulfilled its stated aim: to document, candidly and systematically, what the MROR programme has achieved, where it falls short, and what lessons can be credibly transferred to road agencies in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa considering results-based contracting reform.

14. Acknowledgements

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